A heap of — what?
Wittgensteinian musings on the ‘sorites’ paradox, with contemporary edgy examples (spoiler alert)
Cicero’s De Academica presents a defence of philosophical scepticism that may well — we don’t know — be distantly behind the unkind derogatory use of the term ‘academic’. When this old word is used today in the news media, you can bet the user means something which is broadly ‘irrelevant, recondite, esoteric, nonsensical, a heap of …’
The ancient sceptics Cicero seemingly defends in the dialogue in fact faced a serious dilemma: the so-called apraxia problem. Their scepticism about whether we could know anything seems to make practical life impossible. For everyday activities just rest on basic kinds of know-how — and often, moral commitments which people take to be non-negotiable, not just ‘probable’.
Augustine would lambast Cicero on this apraxia front in his Contra Academicos. Many of the ancient sceptical arguments are however well worth considering, this side of an unconditional commitment to doubting everything (so you would not ‘know’ whether you are alive, and not dead, or not a giant insect (Kafka shout out), etc.)
One of these sceptical arguments that is worth considering, arguably, is the vexing ‘sorites’ paradox. It’s so named from the Greek word for ‘heap’.